We develop an empirical model to estimate the impact of UI on unemployment duration and reemployment wages. The model estimates the UI receipt, unemployment duration and re-employment wage equations simultaneously and incorporates unobserved heterogeneity variables in each equation and allows them to be correlated. The NLSY79 data is used to estimate the model. Some results are found support of the positive effect of UI on re-employment wages.
Introduction
The disincentive effect of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits has been discussed extensively in the unemployment and UI literature. A substantial amount of empirical evidence has been found in support of the hypotheses that extending benefit durations or increasing benefit levels decrease the reemployment hazards and increase the joblessness durations of the unemployed.
1 However, UI receipt may have a positive effect on post-displacement wages.
The difficulty in measuring the effect of UI is because the receipt of UI, the benefit level and duration are potentially endogenous. Individuals who expect a long unemployment spell and large earning drop may be more likely to claim benefits, UI recipients may be found to have relatively lower post-displacement wages than non-recipients. Little research has been done that estimates UI receipt, unemployment duration, and post-displacement earnings simultaneously while accounting for selectivity due to UI receipt and unobserved heterogeneity in UI receipt, unemployment duration, and subsequent wage. 
Empirical Model
We develop a multi-episode, random-effects model of the duration of unemployment and re-employment wage following a job loss that allows the unobservable determinants of UI receipt to be correlated with the unobservable determinants of the unemployment duration and re-employment wage 4
The model uses a discrete-time hazard model for unemployment durations (see Meyer, 1990 ). Let D s be the time until the person becomes reemployed after the s th job loss and let C s be a censoring variable which equals one if the spell is incomplete.
The discrete hazard of re-employment at k weeks of unemployment is
where x sk is a vector of exogenous (possibly-time varying) variables, y s is a vector of possibly endogenous variables and k λ are the baseline hazard parameters.
Here the endogenous variables in the duration equation are all functions of one endogenous variable, UI receipt, which we denote by u s and model by
where z is a vector of exogenous variables (which may include some variables from x) and u ξ is an unmeasured variable that is assumed to be independent of z and x. If Finally, we assume that the re-employment wage after the s th job loss, w s , is log-normally distributed: Under (1) - (3), the likelihood function for the i th individual is then 
Data
The sample of unemployment spells and re-employment wages is derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Here, we constructed panel data containing individual weekly job histories up until the time of the 2002 survey.
All demographic variables are updated on a yearly basis and the value at the beginning of the year in which a job loss occurred is assigned to that particular job loss episode.
Using data on state UI rules contained in the Department of Labor's semiannual publication Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws we compiled state UI policy rules on such parameters as the maximum benefit amount.
Based on these policy rules and weekly earnings history, we determined eligibility and calculated the weekly benefit amount (WBA) that individual's qualified for. We also determined whether a state required a waiting period, the maximum duration of regular benefits, and whether the state had extended benefits in a year. Moreover, state level variables based on administrative data were constructed for UI initial claim denial rates, on-going-claim denial rates, state average real WBA. Only unemployment spells where an individual did not return to the previous employer are included in the analysis. Selected summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . A sample consists of a total of 13,387 spells of unemployment associated with 5732 individuals.
Results
The impact of UI receipt and unemployment durations on the re-employment wage are identified by the state's average denial rates and by spouse's past use of UI and by the time-varying nature of the state's monthly unemployment rate over an unemployment spell. Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates of for a model with a three mass-point distribution. Here we discuss only coefficient estimates associated with variables pertaining to UI system, in particular, WBA and duration of benefits, on re-employment wages. These are reported in column (3) of Table 2 .
Here we see that the impact of WBA for UI recipients on the re-employment wage as measured by the coefficient of WBA x UI is positive and statistically significant. This positive impact, however, is for unemployment spells equal to 1 week. Thus, initially, a $100 increase in weekly benefits increases the re-employment wage by nearly 7 percent. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction variable ui x spell x wba implies, however, that the impact dissipates with the length of the unemployment spell. Specifically, the effect of a $100 increase is zero after approximately 34 weeks of unemployment which is consistent with search models that predict that the reservation wage decreases smoothly to that of a non-recipient at the time of benefit exhaustion.
The coefficient associated with the duration of regular UI benefits is positive and statistically significant and suggests that increasing the duration of UI benefits by 1 week increases re-employment wages by approximately one percent.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a random-effects panel data model, which jointly models probability of UI receipt, the unemployment duration and re-employment wage in each job loss episode of an individual, to estimate the impact of UI policy characteristics such as the weekly benefit level and regular benefit durations on an individual's reemployment wage following a spell of unemployment. The model estimates show some evidence of the positive effect of WBA on re-employment wages but only for those with short unemployment durations. Empirical support was month of job loss, year of job loss, dummies for high quarter earnings indicating whether high quarter earnings were between 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, 6-7, 7-8, 8-9 , and 9-10 thousand dollars and dummies for base period earnings indicating whether base period earnings were between 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, 10-12, 12-14, 14-16, 16-18, 18-20, 20-25 and 25-30 thousand dollars. 
